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ABSTRACT 
 
This essay evaluates the state of regulation by the United States government and 
State legislatures of participants in emerging virtual-currency businesses. It points to 
friction points as both the federal government and the States experiment with their 
own regulatory authority over virtual-currency businesses and provides a taxonomy 
of differing approaches to regulating such businesses. The essay takes the position that 
the States need to act in the near term if they wish to maintain their longstanding role 
as regulators of non-depository providers of financial products and services—or they 
risk being preempted by Congress or federal regulatory actions. This essay also 
suggests that regulating providers of virtual-currency products and services is a course 
preferable to regulating the products and services themselves. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Virtual currencies have been around much longer than current discussions of these 
technologies, or their regulation, would suggest. Virtual currencies emerged as e-
commerce did, taking off in the mid-1990s.1  
                                                          
* Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law at the Maurer 
School of Law at Indiana University. She appreciates the opportunity to share this essay with 
readers of the Cleveland State Law Review, and the invitation of Professor Brian Ray and the 
editors of the Law Review to participate in the April 2018 Blockchain Law and Technology 
Symposium. Professor Hughes wishes readers to be aware that she served as the Reporter for 
the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act 
(2017), a product of collaboration between Uniform Law Commissioners and many 
stakeholders, as well as for the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Supplemental 
Commercial Law Act for the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (2018). 
As Reporter, she admits she cannot contain her enthusiasm for the Act’s exemptions and 
“registration” sandbox. Professor Hughes can be reached at sjhughes@indiana.edu. SSRN 
author page, http://ssrn.com/author =408848. 
 1  See Ian Grigg, A Quick History of Cryptocurrencies BBTC – Before Bitcoin, 
BITCOINMAGAZINE (Apr. 16, 2014), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/quick-history-
cryptocurrencies-bbtc-bitcoin-1397682630/ (reprinted from financialcryptography.com). For 
some additional analysis, see Steven Levy, E-Money – That’s What I Want, WIRED (Dec. 1, 
1994) [hereinafter E-Money], https://www.wired.com/1994/12/emoney/ (describing early 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/8
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Virtual currencies did not become part of wider discussions—and the term “the 
blockchain” was little heard of—until the publication of Satoshi Nakamoto’s famous 
paper entitled A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System in 2009.2 Nakamoto’s paper 
introduced us to Bitcoin and the public ledger associated with it, known as “the 
blockchain.”3  
Bitcoin and other virtual currencies that followed were seen by some as a means 
of proofing e-commerce payments against the “double-spending” and counterfeit 
problems that Internet -based payments without separate verification platforms can 
pose,4 and preserving anonymity in payments that are similar to cash.5 
Since 2009, government interest in regulating virtual currencies, blockchain 
technologies, and providers of both currencies and services related to them, has grown 
as the types of transactions and the types of regulatory challenges that certain 
technologies and providers bring into governments’ scrutiny.6  
We stand at a friction point in the regulation of virtual currencies, blockchain 
technologies, providers of virtual-currency, and other blockchain-based products and 
services—and perhaps all “fintech” or “financial technology” enterprises.7 This 
friction point involves what appear to be competing regulatory priorities and 
approaches rather than one point of disagreement.8 These competing approaches cover 
many concerns that emerged as e-commerce developed more than 20 years ago, 
particularly regarding whether to allow e-commerce to avoid or comply with extant 
regulatory obligations and, more specifically, how to regulate them. The recurrence of 
similar issues of how and to what extent governments should regulate this new 
technology, and which governments and government agencies should play the single 
lead role or how to parcel out the regulation of virtual currencies, technologies, and 
providers among governments and agencies with logical and historical connections to 
the regulation of the issues that virtual currencies and related new technologies, should 
help inform important regulatory decisions in the near and medium terms. 
This essay looks at this regulatory friction through the lens of numerous competing 
approaches to the regulation of providers of virtual-currency payments and storage 
                                                          
participants in the e-money marketplaces and the efforts of cryptographic pioneers David 
Chaum of Digicash and others).  
 2  Satoshi Nakamoto, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 3  See Nolan Bauerle, What Is Blockchain Technology, COINDESK 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-blockchain-technology/ (last visited Oct. 3, 
2018). Readers unfamiliar with blockchain technology will find this explanation particularly 
useful.   
 4  See Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 1. 
 5  See E-Money, supra note 1. For the original explanation of the privacy feature in Bitcoin, 
see Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 6. 
 6  BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CRYPTOCURRENCIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE HYPE (June 
17, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2018e5.pdf.  
 7  Andrew Norry, An In-Depth Look at Bitcoin Laws & Future Regulation, BLOCKONOMI 
(July 2, 2018), https://blockonomi.com/bitcoin-regulation/. 
 8  Gareth W. Peters et al., Trends in Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technologies: A 
Monetary Theory and Regulation Perspective, 3 EY GLOBAL FIN. SER. INST. 1, 37 (2015). 
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products and services in the U.S. marketplace in 2018. These include, in reverse 
chronological order,9 the July 31, 2018 issuance of the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency’s Policy Statement on Fintech Charters,10 the July 31, 2018 report from 
the Department of the Treasury entitled “A Financial System That Creates Economic 
Opportunities—Nonbank Financials, Fintech, and Innovation,”11 the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection’s July 2018 announcement that it would use its Office 
of Innovation to explore regulation of virtual currencies with non-domestic 
regulators,12 the launch of the State of Arizona’s “regulatory sandbox” for fintech 
companies,13 amendments to state “money transmitter” regulatory statutes,14 the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ pilot program for reciprocal licensure,15 the 
Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses 
Act,16 and the BitLicense regulation promulgated by the New York State Department 
of Financial Services in 2015.17 Additional sources of friction include the approaches 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodities Futures Trading 
                                                          
 9  The analysis presented in later parts of this essay does not proceed on the same reverse 
chronological basis. Rather, it proceeds with the approaches taken by the States to date and the 
visions articulated by the Department of the Treasury and Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency by classifying the approaches into a rough taxonomy.  
 10  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (July 31, 
2018) [hereinafter OCC POLICY STATEMENT], https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-
by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf. 
 11  U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., REPORT: A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES -- NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION (July 31, 2018) 
[hereinafter 2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT], https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf. 
 12  Press Release, Bur. of Cons. Fin. Prot., BCFP Collaborates with Regulators Around the 
World to Create Global Financial Innovation Network (Aug. 7, 2018) [hereinafter BCFP Global 
Network Press Release], https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bcfp-
collaborates-regulators-around-world-create-global-financial-innovation-network/. 
 13  H.R. 2434, 53rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018) [hereinafter Arizona Fintech Bill] 
(amending Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1491.10, adding Chapter 55 to Ariz. Rev. Stat., amending Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 44-1531.01). 
 14  See Justin S. Wales, State Regulation on Virtual Currency and Blockchain Technologies, 
CARLTONFIELDS (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2018/state-regulations-on-virtual-
currency-and-blockcha. 
 15  CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORS TAKE FIRST STEP TO 
STANDARDIZE LICENSING PRACTICES FOR FINTECH PAYMENTS (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-take-first-step-standardize-licensing-practices-fintech-
payments. 
 16  UNIF. L. COMM’N, UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT (July 
19, 2017), www.uniformlaws.org (final text of the act, the prefatory note, and comments 
published in October 2017). 
 17  23 N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 200 (2015) (effective Aug. 8, 2015). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/8
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Commission have taken, which are not the focus of this essay.18 Friction in this 
environment also arises as other nations—such as Malta19 and Singapore20—start to 
stake out their positions on virtual-currency providers.  
The approach preferred by the virtual-currency and blockchain communities may 
be to have no regulations governing their activities, but that approach is increasingly 
unrealistic given the volumes of activity by third-party providers of virtual-currency 
products and services and domestic and global value flows in virtual currencies. This 
don’t-regulate-us approach also is out of sync with the history of regulating payments 
and currency in the United States—a history back to Colonial Times.21 Under this 
don’t-regulate-us approach, the United States would fail a core challenge in the 
Treasury’s 2018 Fintech Report—to find ways to harmonize regulation and work 
together to improve our regulatory marketplace.  
Part II of this essay describes these divergent regulatory approaches with a focus 
on providers of virtual-currency products and services that are exchanges, wallet 
providers, centralized issuers, and custodians in the United States.22 This Part does not 
proceed in the same reverse chronological basis as mentioned in Part I. Rather, it 
addresses categories of proposed and extant regulatory approaches taken such as 
federal bank charters, state bank or industrial loan company charters, full licensure in 
individual states, reciprocal state licensure, regulatory sandboxes and other innovation 
incentives, and other models, offering readers a preliminary taxonomy of regulatory 
choices. 
Part III explains why start-ups need a safe “location” from which to test products 
and grow. Consider the two-year permissioned “sandbox” option the State of Arizona 
adopted on July 1, 201823 or the dollar-limited, non-permissioned “registration” option 
included in the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency 
                                                          
 18  The regulation of cryptocurrencies as securities or commodities is the subject of 
numerous works in progress. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and 
the Struggle of Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Melanie 
L. Fein, Bitcoin: How Is It Regulated? (June 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166894. 
 19  See, e.g., Jimmy Aki, Malta Approves Favorable Cryptocurrency Bills in Next Step as a 
Blockchain Island, BITCOINMAGAZINE (June 29, 2018), 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/malta-passes-favorable-cryptocurrency-laws-next-step-
blockchain-island/ (note that the correction explanation suggests that these bills passed only one 
organ of government and need final approval). 
 20  See Samburaj Das, Singapore Mulls New Rules to Safeguard Cryptocurrency, ICO 
Investors, CCN.COM (March 1, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/singapore-explores-new-rules-
safeguard-cryptocurrency-investors/ (reporting that Singapore’s Monetary Authority is 
considering bringing cryptocurrency providers under its Payment Services Bill in 2018). 
 21  See Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Substitutes for Legal Tender: Lessons 
from History for the Regulation of Virtual Currencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE LAW 37 (John A. Rothchild ed., Edward Elgar 2016). 
 22  This essay does not analyze the potential effects of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s final rule, Rules Concerning Prepaid Accounts under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
(Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 83 Fed. Reg. 6364 (Feb. 13, 2018), 
codified at 12 C.F.R. Parts 1005 and 1026.  
 23  Arizona Fintech Bill, supra note 13, at § 41-5602. 
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Businesses Act (“URVCBA”), but not yet enacted or implemented in any state.24 The 
availability of incubators is not contrary to views expressed in the Treasury’s 2018 
Fintech Report.25 These pro-innovation incubator options contrast with states that are 
focused on amending already non-uniform money-transmitter statutes to include 
providers of virtual-currency payment products and services.26 These money-
transmitter amendments do not include, at least for now, equivalents of Arizona’s 
sandbox, the ULC’s full-exemption and “registration” statuses, or the OCC’s special-
purpose or full-fledged national bank charters. 27  
Part IV discusses another source of friction, or at least concern, for virtual-currency 
providers—the risks of being prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 for being unlicensed 
by the states in which they do business or not registered with Treasury’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”). This Part also explains why virtual-
currency businesses should ensure that they comply with existing anti-money-
laundering (“AML”) and Office of Foreign Asset Controls (“OFAC”) requirements, 
as well as meeting their state-license compliance responsibilities. Part V offers some 
conclusions. 
II. FRICTION: COMPETING REGULATORY APPROACHES ADVANCED IN THE UNITED 
STATES SINCE 2015 
A major, if not the major, source of friction in the licensure and regulation of 
virtual-currency businesses in the United States stems from the rapidly multiplying 
approaches to these issues at the federal and state levels.28 This Part of this essay offers 
readers a taxonomy of regulatory approaches that are being used or may be available 
to third-party providers of virtual-currency products and services in the United States 
based on options that appear to be available as of July 31, 2018. It includes analysis 
of the Treasury’s July 31, 2018 Fintech Report and of the Comptroller’s July 31, 2018 
Policy Statement on Financial Technology Companies’ Eligibility to Apply for 
National Bank Charters, as well as of various state approaches.  
A. Federal Bank Charters and Special-Purpose National Bank Charters 
On July 31, 2018, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a Policy Statement29 and 
a supplement to the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual30 announcing that it would take 
                                                          
 24  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 207. 
 25  2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11, at 66–68, 167–69 (respectively, praising 
states as laboratories for innovation and advocating flexible regulatory regimes with options 
other than approval and disapproval, and “meaningful experimentation in the real world, subject 
to appropriate limitations”). 
 26  For discussion of specific states’ approaches, see infra Part II. Additional analysis is 
offered in Trautman, supra note 18, at 42–48. 
 27  OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10. 
 28  Mark Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public Payments 
Law, 67 HASTING L. J. 1493, 1493 (2016).  
 29  OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10. 
 30  OCC, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER 
APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (2018), 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/8
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applications for charters under its National Bank Act31 authority. The options 
specifically include “special purpose national bank charters” and full national bank 
charters. The announcement32 suggests that applicant must be engaged in “the business 
of banking.”33 The announcement also explained that “the business of banking” 
includes three functions—taking deposits, paying checks, and lending money.34 
Entities that “take deposits” will need to obtain federal deposit insurance from the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in addition to their OCC charters before they 
can commence business.35 Entities that pay checks or lend money, or both, without 
taking deposits have not been required to hold bank charters or to have federal deposit 
insurance. These entities have been regulated by the states as check cashers36 or 
licensed lenders37 unless they held “special purpose bank charters.”38 
“Special purpose banks” were limited to trust banks, banker’s banks, and credit 
card banks39 until the Comptroller began to explore chartering fintech companies as 
special purpose banks in 2016.40 The Comptroller’s July 31, 2018 Policy Statement 
continued to cite the existing regulation codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 for the scope of 
potential authority for new fintech special-purpose banks.41 In a now-dismissed 
                                                          
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/file-pub-lm-
considering-charter-applications-fintech.pdf. 
 31  National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1988).  
 32  Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC begins Accepting 
National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018) 
[hereinafter NR 2018-74], https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-
2018-74.html. 
 33  Id.; 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 26 (1982).  
 34  NR 2018-74, supra note 32; 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2015). It may become important 
to remember that physical locations at which a bank performs all three functions constitutes a 
“branch,” a status that implicates other considerations under § 36(j) of the National Bank Act. 
12 U.S.C. § 36(j) (2000). 
 35  12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).  
 36  See UNIF. L. COMM’N, CURRENT STATE REGULATION OF NONDEPOSITORY PROVIDERS OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES (“NDPS”), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/money%20services/ndpnbfi.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2018). 
 37  Id.  
 38  12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i).   
 39  NR 2018-74, supra note 32; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(c)(2)(D) and (F) (2010). For a more 
complete statement of the history and scope of these provisions, see Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285, 291–94 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 40  Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Address at the Georgetown University 
Law Center: Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016-152.pdf; OCC, 
EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-
charters-for-fintech.pdf.  
 41  OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10.  
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challenge to the Comptroller’s 2017 plans to charter fintech companies,42 the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors argued that these traditional types of special-
purpose banks are the only types of special-purpose charters the Comptroller may 
grant.43 
All fintech charter applicants, the announcement explained, “will be supervised 
like similarly situated national banks,”44 will need to hold capital, demonstrate 
liquidity, to make financial inclusion commitments appropriate to their business 
plans,45 to submit “acceptable contingency” plans for “significant financial stress that 
could threaten the viability of the bank,”46 and should expect to be subject to 
“heightened supervision initially, similar to other de novo banks.”47 
The Comptroller’s announcement has energized some participants in the virtual-
currency community to imagine that they could obtain nationwide authority without 
the necessity of obtaining licenses as money transmitters or money services businesses 
in all jurisdictions that require them. As the Complaint filed by the CSBS notes, such 
charters free charter-holders from many state laws beyond those requiring state 
licensure.48 
The prospect of special-purpose bank charters likely tantalizes virtual-currency 
companies as well as those in the broader range of fintech companies. However, the 
OCC’s July 31, 2018 Policy Statement suggests that it will impose high standards and 
will look favorably on applicants that “[have] a reasonable chance of success, will be 
operated in a safe and sound manner, will treat customers fairly, and will comply with 
applicable laws and regulations.”49 The Policy Statement also explained that the OCC 
will not approve “proposals that include financial products and services that have 
predatory, unfair, or deceptive features or that pose risk to consumer protection[.]”50 
Thus, it is clear that the OCC will not be chartering every applicant for a special-
purpose bank charter. Indeed, the OCC’s proposed special-purpose bank charters 
require advance permission.51 Given the high hurdles in the criteria explained above, 
this appears to be intended only for applicants with substantial capital and the ability 
to manage the application process. 
                                                          
 42  Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 301–02 (dismissing case on 
lack of standing grounds). The challenge brought by the New York State Department of 
Financial Services was dismissed on December 20, 2017. Vullo v. OCC, No. 17 Civ. 3574 
(NRB), 2017 WL 6512245, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017). 
 43  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 6, 31–46, Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-CV-00763). 
 44  NR 2018-74, supra note 32. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 43, at ¶ 11. 
 49  OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3. 
 50  Id. at 3–4. 
 51  See 12 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1988) (certificate of authorization before commencing banking). 
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B. State Bank Charters or Industrial Loan Company Charters 
States also charter banks and industrial loan companies (“ILCs”).52 State-chartered 
banks need advance approval before they open for business from both the state’s 
chartering authority and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.53 State-chartered 
banks are subject to the same limitations on their ownership—to preserve the 
separation of banking and commerce observed in the United States at least since the 
Banking Act of 193354 and the Securities Act of 1933.55 Thus, state-chartered banks 
are in the advance-permission, high-hurdle situations such as federally chartered banks 
with limitations on their ownership.  
Industrial loan companies have powers like those enjoyed by state-chartered 
banks; they also need advance state approvals and FDIC approval.56 However, an 
important difference is that owners of ILC applicants are not subject to the federal 
Bank Holding Company Act.57 Thus, commercial firms can apply for industrial-loan 
company charters and some have. In 2017, for example, two fintech companies 
applied for ILC permissions: Social Finance (known as “SoFi Bank”) and Square, 
Inc.58 Square’s ILC application with Utah remains active, but Square withdrew its 
FDIC application “temporarily” in June 2018.59 
 52  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-751, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS 
(2005). 
53  How Can I Start a Bank?, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12779.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013). 
 54  Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (also known as the 
Banking Act of 1933). 
 55  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) 
(1994).  
 56  For a comprehensive review of the FDIC’s authority to supervise industrial loan 
companies, see Mindy West, The FDIC’s Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A 
Historical Perspective, FED. DEP. INS. CORP. (2004), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum04/sisummer04-
article1.pdf. 
57  Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852 (1994); West, supra note 56. 
 58  See Application Status, UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., https://dfi.utah.gov/general-
information/application-status/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2017); Cinar Oney, Fintech Industrial 
Banks and Beyond: How Banking Innovations Affect the Federal Safety Net, 23 FORDHAM J.
CORP & FIN. L. 541 (2018). For more discussion, see, Kevin Petrasic et al., Fintech Companies 
and Bank Charters: Options and Considerations for 2018, WHITE & CASE (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/fintech-companies-and-bank-charters-options-
and-considerations-2018.   
 59  See Michelle Price, Payments Processor Square Inc. Withdraws Banking Application: 
Statement, REUTERS (July 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-square-fdic-
license/payments-processor-square-inc-withdraws-banking-license-application-statement-
idUSKBN1JV2XG. 
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C. States Offering Only Pre-Approved Full Licensure to Non-Bank Providers 
Including Virtual-Currency Businesses 
States require licenses prior to engaging in certain types of financial services 
activities, particularly when their counter-parties are consumers.60 Lending money is 
one such financial service that requires a license from all states.61 The range of services 
includes mortgage-lending, automobile financing, and other small-dollar loan 
products.62 Another service for which states generally require licensure is traditionally 
known as “money transmission.”63 This category includes sending money from one 
consumer to another or from one location to another without engaging a bank to 
complete the transaction and “payment processing,” a term that covers credit-and-
debit-card processing for merchants and payroll services.64 All states, except Montana, 
have statutes governing “money transmission.”65 These types of state laws normally 
exclude depositary institutions—banks and credit unions—from their scope.66 
State license applications are also relatively costly and time-consuming. For 
example, the Texas Department of Banking requires a non-refundable application fee 
of $10,000 for money transmission licenses ($5,000 for currency-exchange-only 
applications).67 In addition, the Texas Department of Banking requires surety bonds 
for money transmission ranging from $300,000 to $2 million, or a deposit or letter-of-
credit substitute, and net worth ranging from $100,000 (for four or fewer locations in 
Texas) to a minimum for five or more locations of $500,000.68 The time required to 
get a license varies, but there are reports of periods of one to two years.69 Application 
processes have generated complaints from stakeholders in the past.70 The press release 
                                                          
 60  Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting Fintech Law, 18 FINTECH L. REP. 1, 18 (2015). 
 61  Id. 
 62  See Types of Loans: What Are The Differences?, VALUEPENGUIN 
https://www.valuepenguin.com/loans/types-of-loans (last visited Oct. 13, 2018). 
 63  Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks: Are You 
Ready To Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1250 (2016). 
 64  See id. at 1252. 
 65  See THOMAS BROWN, CAL. STATE ASSEMB., COMM. ON BANKING & FIN., 50-STATE 
SURVEY: MONEY TRANSMITTER LICENSING REQUIREMENTS (2013). 
 66  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.42(7) (2016) (stating the definition of a “depository 
institution”); see § 53-208.44 (explaining the exemptions for persons required to have a money 
transmitter license to engage in business in North Carolina). 
 67  See TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, GENERAL APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS, 
http://www.dob.texas.gov/applications-forms-publications/general-application-requirements 
(last updated Sept. 2017). 
 68  Id.  
 69  Faisal Khan, How Difficult Is It to Get a Money Transmitter License for Texas?, QUORA 
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.quora.com/How-difficult-is-it-to-get-a-money-transmitter-
license-for-Texas. 
 70  See THOMAS BROWN, supra note 65; see generally Bloomberg Law, Money Transmitter: 
Licensing Guidance, 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/bankfinance/page/bf_money_transmitter_guidance 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
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announcing the State of Arizona’s new “regulatory sandbox,” described in a later 
subpart of this essay, stated: 
Currently, it can take a startup several months and tens of thousands of 
dollars in fees, compliance costs, and legal expenses to navigate the 
regulatory maze in just one state. This slow-moving and expensive process 
is unacceptable in an industry like fintech that is rapidly changing and 
developing.71 
 
Licensure requirements in the United States vary a great deal. Some states 
amended their money transmission statutes to reach providers of virtual-currency 
products and services.72 For example, North Carolina amended its statutory definition 
of “money transmission” in 2016 73 to include “maintaining control of virtual currency 
on behalf of others,” and to define “virtual currency.”74 Washington State similarly 
amended its Money Services Act to included virtual currency.75 Washington also 
excludes banks and credit unions from its statute.76 Other states have not regulated 
virtual-currency providers yet, for example, South Carolina.77 
Like bank and ILC charter holders, state money transmission and money services 
statutes take an all-or-nothing approach to regulating virtual-currency providers.78 If 
the business activity meets the statutory definition, then the business must have a 
license before it offers its products or services to the public.79 Unlicensed activity is 
met with the prospect of criminal prosecutions and penalties.80  
                                                          
 71  Press Release, Ariz. Att’y Gen., Ariz. Becomes First State in U.S. to Offer Fintech 
Regulatory Sandbox (Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press 
Release], https://www.azag.gov/press-release/arizona-becomes-first-state-us-offer-fintech-
regulatory-sandbox. 
 72  Dale A. Werts & Tedrick A. Housh III, Blockchain and Cryptocurrency: State Law 
Roundup, LATHROP GAGE (July 9, 2018), https://www.lathropgage.com/newsletter-239.html. 
 73  N.C. GEN. STAT., § 53.208.42(13) (2016).  
 74  Id. § 53.208.42(20). 
 75  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230 (2017). For a listing of virtual-currency licensees in 
Washington State, see DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., LICENSEE LIST – VIRTUAL CURRENCY, 
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/virtual-currency-licensee-list.pdf (last 
updated Sept. 5, 2018). 
 76  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.020 (2017). 
 77  Heather Morton, Cryptocurrency 2018 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 
(July 5, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/cryptocurrency-
2018-legislation.aspx. 
 78  See PETER VAN VALKENBURGH, THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE TO STATE 
MONEY TRANSMISSION LICENSING 3 (2018). 
 79  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.030; id. § 19.230.010(17)–(19). 
 80  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.300 (criminal penalties); N.C. GEN. STAT § 
53-208.58(c) (2016) (criminal penalties for engaging in business without first obtaining a 
license). 
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D. Efforts to Increase Reciprocal Recognition of Licenses Issued by Other States 
Including a Pilot Reciprocity Program to Increase Harmonization of Licensing, 
Regulations, and Examinations 
Efforts to reduce barriers between and among state licensure requirements since 
2016 have come in two forms: enhanced coordination in licensing and supervision and 
proposed legislation that specifically encourages reciprocal licensure.81 Both forms 
use the CSBS’ Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System.82 This subpart of this essay 
looks at both approaches as alternatives to federal preemption of state regulations 
relating to virtual-currency business licensure, regulation, and examination—
preemption that might come in new legislation or by virtue of holding federal fintech 
charters.  
1. Enhanced Coordination in Licensure and Supervision—the CSBS Vision 2020 
Approach 
In its May 2017 Vision 2020 announcement, the CSBS set forth a goal that “[b]y 
2020, state regulators will adopt an integrated, 50-state licensing and supervisory 
system, leveraging technology and smart regulatory policy to transform the interaction 
between industry, regulators and consumers.”83 In February 2018, the CSBS launched 
a pilot program to increase harmonization of licensing and other regulatory 
requirements and examinations of non-depository providers of consumer financial 
services licensed by states, including agreements by seven states to accept licensing 
findings of other states.84  
The CSBS issued a report on its efforts in June 2018.85 That report identified 
“common goals shared between regulators and the industry that will help guide 
improvements to the state supervisory process.”86 These included efforts to “support 
innovation and startups, enable national scale, strengthen the financial system, and 
uphold important consumer protections.”87 In August 2018, the CSBS issued an 
                                                          
 81  CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORS NATIONWIDE ADOPT SINGLE 
EXAM FOR MORTGAGE LICENSING (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-
nationwide-adopt-single-exam-mortgage-licensing. 
 82  Id. 
 83  CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, VISION 2020 FOR FINTECH AND NON-BANK 
REGULATION (May 10, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/csbs-announces-vision-2020-fintech-and-
non-bank-regulation. 
 84  CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORS TAKE FIRST STEP TO 
STANDARDIZE LICENSING PRACTICES FOR FINTECH PAYMENTS (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-take-first-step-standardize-licensing-practices-fintech-
payments (participating states include Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Tennessee, 
Texas and Washington). 
 85  CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, VISION 2020 FOR FINTECH AND NON-BANK 
REGULATION (June 7, 2018) [hereinafter JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT], 
https://www.csbs.org/vision2020. 
 86  Id. at 3. 
 87  Id.  
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additional update reporting on progress and describing its next steps.88 In the August 
2018 report, the CSBS announced that 84 percent of the states were using the NMLS 
for money transmitter licensing.89  
Strong participation in the NMLS by states that require licenses for money 
transmission and money services businesses is certainly a huge step forward in 
streamlining the license application processes for fintech and other non-bank 
businesses. The NLMS or other methods to share information from license 
applications, as forward-thinking as the CSBS plans and admirable all-around, do not 
address two significant issues: (1) the variations of coverage in state laws governing 
virtual-currency businesses and (2) the attendant risks of being prosecuted as an 
unlicensed provider by a state whose money transmission or money services laws 
cover virtual-currency services as money transmission or money services, or, more 
significantly, for a failure to hold a license and to register with the Department of the 
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) as a “money services 
business” for which liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 does not have a scienter 
requirement.90  
Only a uniform law that is enacted by many states or federal preemption in a new 
chartering or licensing system will address the risks that arise from non-uniform state 
coverage requirements where Section 1960 liability may arise. Nevertheless, until 
states enact uniform laws governing virtual-currency businesses or a federal regime is 
in place, CSBS’ Vision 2020 is a significant improvement over the status quo ante.  
2. State Statutory Requirements that Encourage Reciprocal Licensing Agreements 
Beyond harmonization of the license application processes that the CSBS Vision 
2020 project is advancing, an alternate route is direct recognition of licenses granted 
by one or more states by other states, a process known as “reciprocity.” The ULC’s 
Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act responds to two concerns 
that CSBS identified in today’s 50-state licensure requirements impose on entrants to 
the fintech business marketplace: lack of clarity about whether businesses need 
licenses in some jurisdictions and duplicative or overlapping license processing 
requirements.91  
The ULC offered two alternative ways to achieve reciprocity in Article 2 of the 
URVCBA.92 The ULC’s URVCBA first encourages the use by states of the 
Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (“NMLS”)93 to permit reciprocal licensing—
an approach not included in CSBS’ Vision 2020 Project.94 In the following excerpt, 
                                                          
 88  CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, CSBS VISION 2020: PROGRESS UPDATE (Aug. 2, 
2018) [hereinafter AUGUST 2018 CSBS PROGRESS UPDATE], https://www.csbs.org/csbs-vision-
2020-progress-update. 
 89  Id. (referencing point three of the report). 
 90  18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2016). 
 91  See JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note 85. 
 92  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203. 
 93  CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, NATIONWIDE MULTISTATE LICENSING SYSTEM, 
https://www.csbs.org/nationwide-multistate-licensing-system (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) 
(explaining that NMLS does not grant or deny licenses).  
 94  JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note 85. 
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the term “registry” specifically refers to the NMLS because of the definition in the 
URVCBA’s Section 102(15).95 Section 203 of the URVCBA provides: 
SECTION 203. LICENSE BY RECIPROCITY. 
Alternative A 
(a) Instead of an application required by Section 202, a person licensed by 
another state to conduct virtual-currency business activity in that state may 
file with the registry an application under this section. 
 
(b) When an application under this section is filed with the registry, the 
applicant shall notify the department in a record that the applicant has 
submitted the application to the registry and shall submit to the department:  
 
(1) a certification of license history from the agency responsible for 
issuing a license in each state in which the applicant has been licensed 
to conduct virtual-currency business activity; 
 
(2) a nonrefundable reciprocal licensing application fee in the amount 
[required by law of this state other than this [act]or specified by the 
department by rule]; 
 
(3) documentation demonstrating that the applicant complies with the 
security and net worth reserve requirements of Section 204; and 
 
(4) a certification signed by an executive officer of the applicant 
affirming that the applicant will conduct its virtual-currency business 
activity with or on behalf of a resident in compliance with this [act]. 
 
(c) The department may permit conduct of virtual-currency business 
activity by an applicant that complies with this section.96  
Comment 4 to URVCBA Section 203 makes clear that the NMLS and Registry is 
the preferred mechanism for “submission and management of reciprocal licensure 
applications” under the URVCBA.97 The unique addition in Section 203 is its position 
that reciprocal licensure by states is a good approach for the prudential regulation of 
virtual-currency businesses by the states.  
The other option that URVCBA Section 203 suggests is more limited legislative 
authority for bilateral or multilateral reciprocity based on the assessment by state 
banking commissioners or departments that other states have licensure requirements 
comparable to their states’ requirements.98 For this reason, URVCBA Section 203 
includes an alternative way to authorize reciprocity: 
Alternative B 
                                                          
 95  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 102(15). 
 96  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 Alternative A. 
 97  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 cmt. 4. 
 98  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 Alternative B(a)(1). 
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(a) A person licensed by another state to engage in virtual-currency business 
activity in that state may engage in virtual-currency business activity with or 
on behalf of a resident to the same extent as a licensee if: 
 
(1) the department determines that the state in which the person is 
licensed has in force laws regulating virtual-currency business activity 
which are substantially similar to, or more protective of rights of users 
than, this [act];  
 
(2) at least 30 days before the person commences virtual-currency 
business activity with or on behalf of a resident, the person submits to 
the department: 
 
  (A) notice containing: 
 
(i) a statement that the person will rely on reciprocal 
licensing; 
 
(ii) a copy of the license to conduct virtual-currency 
business activity issued by the other state; and 
 
(iii) a certification of license history from the agency 
responsible for issuing the license to conduct virtual-
currency business activity in the other state; 
 
(B) a nonrefundable reciprocal license fee in the amount [required 
by law of this state other than this [act] or specified by the 
department by rule]; 
 
(C) documentation demonstrating that the applicant complies with the 
security and net worth reserve requirements of Section 204; and 
 
(D) a certification signed by an executive officer of the applicant 
affirming that the applicant will conduct its virtual-currency business 
activity with or on behalf of a resident in compliance with this [act]; 
 
(3) subject to subsection (b), the department does not deny the 
application not later than [15] days after receipt of the items submitted 
under paragraph (2); and 
 
(4) subject to subsection (b), the applicant does not commence virtual-
currency business activity with or on behalf of a resident until at least 31 
days after complying with paragraph (2).99  
The approaches offered in the URVCBA go beyond the scope of CSBS’ Vision 
2020 project. The URVCBA offers legislative authority for reciprocal licensing; the 
CSBS approach so far only allows sharing of license application information and 
investigatory results. These are no small achievements, but far less than legislative 
                                                          
 99  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 Alternative B. 
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authority allowing true reciprocity.100 Still, both the URVCBA and CSBS’ Vision 
2020 are efforts to reduce friction in the initial licensure and later supervision of 
virtual-currency businesses.101  
E. “Regulatory Sandboxes” Based on Prior Approval to Operate and Other 
“Sandbox” Options—Arizona, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, and 
the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act 
“Regulatory sandboxes” allow innovators in fintech, blockchain, and 
cryptocurrencies the ability to operate with the need for full licensure on a trial basis, 
but the criteria used to determine eligibility or the need for approval prior to operations 
may differ.102 In some foreign nations, a “regulatory sandbox license” is required.103 
1. Arizona’s 2018 Regulatory Sandbox Legislation 
Arizona became the first U.S. state to authorize a regulatory sandbox when its 
governor signed House Bill 2434 on March 23, 2018.104 The new program was 
approved for launch on July 1, 2018.105 Authority for the regulatory sandbox program 
ends on July 1, 2028.106  
The legislation offers—on a prior approval basis only—applicants a 24-month 
period107 in which a fintech company can engage in transactions with Arizona 
residents without obtaining full licensure to operate.108 Other features of Arizona’s 
sandbox program are important to note. First, all customers of the approved companies 
must be residents of Arizona109 and the legislation caps the number of customers an 
approved company may serve.110 If the company is testing products or services as a 
money transmitter, as that term is defined in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 6-1201, the sandbox 
legislation limits individual transactions per consumer to $2,500, and aggregate 
transactions per consumer to not more than $25,000.111 The Arizona Attorney General 
may authorize holders of money transmitter sandbox approvals to deal with as many 
as 17,500 consumers, with a $15,000 limit per transaction and an aggregate limit of 
                                                          
 100  JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note 85. 
 101  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203; JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note 
85. 
 102  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52. 
 103  See, e.g., BOARD OF INVESTMENT MAURITIUS, REGULATORY SANDBOX LICENSE, 
www.investmauritius.com/schemes/rsl.aspx. 
 104  Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press Release, supra note 71, at 1. 
 105  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5612, 41-3102 (2018). 
 106  Id. 
 107  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(A)(1) (2018). 
 108  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §41-5601(6); Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press Release, 
supra note 71, at 1. 
 109  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Title 41, Ch. 55, § 41-5605(B)(1) (2018). 
 110  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(B)(2) (2018) (capping at 10,000 consumers the 
authority under the sandbox program for participating companies). 
 111  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(B)(4) (2018).  
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$50,000 per consumer, if the sandbox applicant demonstrates “adequate financial 
capitalization, risk management process and management oversight.”112 The 
participating companies must comply with Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act113 and all 
statutory limits and caps in Arizona law related to financial transactions.114 Arizona 
House Bill 2434 also allows firms to test new products in a regulatory sandbox for 
which they do not already have permission from the State.115 
The sandbox will be administered by the Office of Arizona’s Attorney General,116 
not by its traditional regulator of non-depository providers. A key feature is the grant 
of discretion to the Arizona Attorney General to deny applications.117 Denials are 
explicitly not appealable agency actions.118 
2. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s Global Financial Innovation 
Network 
Another regulatory sandbox may result from the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection’s Global Financial Innovation Network, which was announced in August 
2018.119 The Bureau announced its global regulator partners, including the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority, Abu Dhabi Global Markets, Autorité des 
marches financiers (Québec), Australian Securities & Investments Commission, 
Central Bank of Bahrain, Dubai Financial Services Authority Guernsey Financial 
Services Commission, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, Ontario Securities Commission, and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP).120 This program is not limited to participants offering virtual-currency 
products and services. 
The BCFP issued a draft document describing aspects of the collaboration in which 
it expects to participate that, among other things, specifically mentions providing 
“firms with an environment in which to trial cross-border solutions.”121 The draft sets 
forth common objectives found in global regulatory sandbox programs, including: 
supporting financial innovation and fintech firms offering new products, services, or 
business models; fostering a financial services system that is “more efficient and 
manages risks more effectively;” understanding how emerging technologies and 
business models “interact with the regulatory framework and where it may lead to 
                                                          
 112  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(C)(1)-(2) (2018). 
 113  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521-1534 (2018). 
 114  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(B)(3) (2018). 
 115  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-41-5603(D) (2018). 
 116  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5602 (2018). 
 117  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5603(J) (2018). 
 118  Id.  
 119  BCFP Global Network Press Release, supra note 12. 
 120  Id. at 2. 
 121  Id. at 1; BUR. OF CONS. FIN. PROT., GLOBAL FINANCE INNOVATION NETWORK: 
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (2018) [hereinafter BCFP CONSULTATION DOCUMENT], 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_global-financial-innovation-
network_consultation-document.pdf. Comments on the document are due by October 14, 2018. 
See BCFP Global Network Press Release, supra note 12, at 2. 
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barriers to entry,” promoting “effective competition in the interest of consumers;” and 
promoting “financial inclusion for consumers.”122 The document also defines the 
testing that sandbox firms may engage in as “either on a virtual basis with data sets, 
or in a love market with real consumers or market participants.”123 
3. Threshold-Based Exemptions from Full-Licensure or Activity Exclusions from 
Licensure Requirements under the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation 
of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act—Another Key Part of the Uniform Law 
Commission’s Approach 
A different type of regulatory environment or “sandbox” that permits testing of 
new products and services among virtual-currency businesses is the ULC’s 
combination of activity exclusions and threshold-basis exemptions from full licensure 
embedded in its URVCBA.124 First, the URVCBA defines “virtual-currency business 
activity” as: 
(A) exchanging, transferring, or storing virtual currency or engaging in 
virtual-currency administration, whether directly or through an agreement 
with a virtual-currency control-services vendor;  
 
(B) holding electronic precious metals or electronic certificates 
representing interests in precious metals on behalf of another person or 
issuing shares or electronic certificates representing interests in precious 
metals; or  
 
(C) exchanging one or more digital representations of value used within 
one or more online games, game platforms, or family of games for: 
 
(i) virtual currency offered by or on behalf of the same publisher from 
which the original digital representation of value was received; or 
 
(ii) legal tender or bank credit outside the online game, game platform, 
or family of games offered by or on behalf of the same publisher from 
which the original digital representation of value was received.125  
That definition, in turn, depends on the scope of the term “virtual currency,” which 
is defined as: 
(A) means a digital representation of value that: 
 
(i) is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value; 
and  
 
(ii) is not legal tender, whether or not denominated in legal tender; and 
 
                                                          
 122  BCFP CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 121. 
 123  Id. at 17. 
 124  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 201.  
 125  Id. § 102(25).  
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(B) does not include: 
 
(i) a transaction in which a merchant grants, as part of an affinity or 
rewards program, value that cannot be taken from or exchanged with 
the merchant for legal tender, bank credit, or virtual currency; or 
 
(ii) a digital representation of value issued by or on behalf of a publisher 
and used solely within an online game, game platform, or family of 
games sold by the same publisher or offered on the same game 
platform.126 
Additionally, the URVCBA has two threshold-based exemptions from full 
licensure.127 For providers “whose virtual-currency business activity with or on behalf 
of residents is reasonably expected to be valued, in the aggregate, on an annual basis 
at $5,000 or less, measured by the U.S. Dollar equivalent of virtual currency,”128 the 
exemption is absolute.129 For providers whose activity is $5,000 or less with residents 
of the enacting state up less than $35,000 on an annual basis measured in the same 
manner, the act requires “registration” with the enacting state and compliance with 
substantive provisions of the act.130 As Comment 2 to URVCBA Section 103 
explains: 
This act sets the full-licensure threshold at an annual transaction volume of 
$35,000 or more in the U.S. Dollar equivalent with residents of an enacting 
state. This figure is intended to allow some “in the wild” testing of the 
products and services in the enacting state. When aggregated with the same 
threshold in other states that enact this act, this threshold is intended to 
allow room for market- and function- testing virtual-currency products or 
services involved on a modest basis in more than one enacting state without 
first needing to hold a license from each of those states. 131 
Section 207 of the URVCBA sets forth the requirements for those seeking to 
operate under the “registration” option below full-licensure status only if 
“registrants” can fulfill the requirements of Subsection 207(a):  
SECTION 207. REGISTRATION IN LIEU OF LICENSE. 
(a) A person whose volume of virtual-currency business activity in U.S. 
Dollar equivalent of virtual currency will not exceed $35,000 annually may 
engage in virtual-currency business activity with or on behalf of a resident 
under a registration without first obtaining a license under this [act] if the 
person: 
                                                          
 126  Id. § 102(23). 
 127  Id. § 207. 
 128  Id. §103(b)(8). 
 129  Id. § 207 cmt. 4. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. § 103 cmt. 2. 
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(1) files with the department a notice in the form and medium prescribed 
by the department of its intention to engage in virtual-currency business 
activity with or on behalf of a resident; 
 (2) provides the information for an investigation under Section 202; 
(3) states the anticipated virtual-currency business activity for its next 
fiscal quarter; 
(4) pays the department a registration fee in the amount [required by 
law of this state other than this [act] or specified by the department by 
rule]; 
(5) if required to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network of the United States Department of the Treasury as a money-
service business, provides the department evidence of the registration; 
(6) provides evidence that the person has policies and procedures to 
comply with the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. Section 5311 et seq. [, as 
amended], and other applicable laws; 
(7) describes the source of funds and credit to be used by the person to 
conduct virtual-currency business activity with or on behalf of a resident 
and provides evidence of and agrees to maintain the minimum net worth 
and reserves required by Section 204 and sufficient unencumbered 
reserves for winding down operations; 
(8) provides the department with evidence that the person has in place 
policies and procedures to comply with [Articles] 3, 5, and 6 and other 
provisions of this [act] designated by the department; and 
(9) provides the department with a copy of its most recent financial 
statement, whether reviewed or audited.132 
URVCBA subsection 207(b) also addresses the duration of a registrant’s 
permission to operate without a full license by requiring a license application “before” 
the registrant’s “virtual-currency business activity . . . with or on behalf of residents 
exceeds $35,000 annually in U.S. Dollar equivalent of virtual currency[.]”133 It also 
allows registrants to operate while their applications for licenses are pending.134  
Unlike Arizona’s provision where the Attorney General must give prior approval 
of sandbox applications, URVCBA Section 207 does not require any form of advance 
permission, just registration, as its title suggests.135 Like Arizona’s sandbox law, 
URVCBA Section 207(c) provides that registrations may be suspended or revoked 
without prior hearings or opportunity to be heard.136  
In addition to the dollar-equivalent cap mentioned above, URVCBA Section 207 
sets outer limits of registrants’ ability to engage with residents of enacting states, viz., 
                                                          
 132  Id. § 207(a). 
 133  Id. § 207(b). 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. § 207 cmt. 3. 
 136  Id. § 207(c). 
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all registrations cease to be effective on the second anniversary of the date of the 
registration.137 The other limits imposed follow action by the regulator in charge in the 
enacting state, viz., actions that deny the registrant’s application for a license or that 
suspend or revoke the registration.138 
Because the registration option applies for engagement with residents in each 
enacting state, and until the second anniversary of each registration, the URVCBA 
affords a broader base of testing products and markets than the Arizona sandbox 
allows, but the scale of activity under URVCBA Section 207 is likely to involve 
fewer consumers per state because of the lower dollar-equivalency cap on activity by 
“registrants.”139  
F. States that Have Announced Intentions Not to Cover Virtual-Currency Businesses 
at This Time 
Some states have signaled their intentions not to regulate virtual-currency 
businesses under existing state money-transmitter or money-services laws, including 
Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Texas.140 One state, Wisconsin, 
apparently has refused to issue money-transmitter licenses to virtual-currency business 
providers.141 
This “non-regulation” approach is one that many providers will like. But, it comes 
with a potential cost: the fact that a state does not require a license or other approval 
or registration of providers seeking to engage with residents of that state may keep 
providers from recognizing that they still have federal compliance obligations under 
guidance issued by the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (“FinCEN”) under regulations it enforces,142 and from appreciating their 
potential liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1960. Additionally, providers in these states will 
have compliance responsibilities under statutes, regulations, and Executive Orders 
enforced by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.143 Thus, although the 
upside is the ability to operate without state compliance responsibilities or application 
costs, the downside of this “regulatory” approach is that it may create a false sense of 
non-regulation and cause less attention to federal compliance responsibilities. 
                                                          
 137  Id. § 207(d)(4). Note that Arizona has imposed a comparable, 24-month limit on 
operations under its sandbox approvals program. 
 138  Id. § 207(d)(1)–(2). 
 139  See id. § 207. 
 140  See generally Wales, supra note 14. 
 141  See State of Wis. Dep’t of Fin. Inst., Sellers of Checks, https://www.wdfi.org/fi/ifs/soc/ 
(last updated Dec. 31, 2017). 
 142  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.100–1010.980 (effective 
March 1, 2011) (replacing 31 C.F.R. Part 103). 
 143  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFAC REGULATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY (Jan. 
24, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/facbk.pdf 
(containing a comprehensive listing of general and country-specific coverage up to early 2012). 
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G. States that Have Not yet Regulated Virtual-Currency Providers Under Money-
Transmission or Money-Services Regimes or Have not yet Indicated Their Intention 
to Do So 
The no-action-yet approach covers the largest number of states in the United 
States. Twenty-seven states have not amended laws or announced their intentions not 
to include virtual-currency products and services under their existing money-
transmission or money-services regulatory regimes as of June 28, 2018. These states 
include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.144 In addition, 
Montana falls into this category primarily because it is the only state without a money-
transmission or money-services regulatory statute as of July 31, 2018. The District of 
Columbia enacted a money-transmission statute in 2018, but it does not specifically 
cover virtual-currency transactions or providers.145 
The downside for virtual-currency business providers in these states are the same 
as described in the previous category—that providers may fail to meet their obligations 
under FinCEN’s guidance or OFAC-enforced statutes, regulations, and Executive 
Orders.  
III. CREATING INCUBATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS AND 
SERVICES 
Innovators in the virtual-currency products and services community need 
environments in which they can test their wares “in the wild.” That is, with real 
customers. This Part of this essay explains why start-ups need a safe “location” from 
which to test products and grow, such as the two-year permissioned “sandbox” option 
in place in the State of Arizona since July 1, 2018146 and the dollar-limited, non-
permissioned “registration” option147 included in the Uniform Law Commission’s 
URVCBA that has not been enacted or implemented in any state as of December 1, 
2018.  
Providers of virtual-currency payments and storage products and services need 
incubator environments because they may not yet be ready either for full licensure by 
states or the fintech charters that the OCC plans to offer. A recent policy update from 
the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell explains two reasons why the OCC charters 
may not come to all participants in this marketplace: 
                                                          
 144  See Wales, supra note 14. Readers should thank Mr. Wales for his comprehensive report 
on the status of state regulations. Note that Mr. Wales cites a report that Oregon may be in the 
classification of states that require licensure as of June 28, 2018, even if there is no publicly 
available statute or regulation taking that position. See id. (citing Bitcoin Regulation Roundup 
Regulator Divide and “Life on Bitcoin,” PYMNTS.COM (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.pymnts.com/in-depth/2015/bitcoin-regulation-roundup-regulator-divide-and-life-
on-bitcoin/). 
 145  See Title 10 of the D.C. Code, Chapter 10, § 26: Money Transmissions (2018). 
 146  Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press Release, supra note 71, at 2. 
 147  UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 207. 
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[I]t is unclear whether a special purpose national bank charter will be a 
viable option for certain fintech companies, as some startup or early-stage 
fintech companies may not be able to satisfy many of the baseline 
supervisory standards, such as those relating to capital, liquidity, and risk 
management requirements. Even mature fintech companies may conclude 
that a special purpose charter does not provide enough benefit to justify 
compliance with a relatively burdensome federal regulatory regime.148 
Similar factors may keep some startup companies from obtaining full state 
licenses. For example, since the New York State “BitLicense” regulation became 
effective on August 8, 2015,149 only five companies had obtained BitLicenses as of 
May 25, 2018.150 Those companies are: Circle, Ripple, Coinbase, BitFlyer, and 
Genesis Global Trading.151 The last approval, of Genesis, followed a long period in 
which Genesis had operated under the “safe harbor” provided to BitLicense applicants 
who filed license applications before the Regulation’s August 8, 2015 effective 
date.152 Presumably, the Department of Financial Services learned a great deal about 
the operations and financial resilience of those applicants in the more than three years 
since the BitLicense regulation became effective.  
Critics of DFS’s pace of granting BitLicenses continue to charge that the 
BitLicense regulator favors better-funded applicants over start-ups.153 Among these 
may be the capital requirements that the regulation authorizes the Superintendent of 
the Department of Financial Services to impose.154 The Superintendent may “consider 
a variety of factors” when determining the minimum capital it will impose on any 
licensee, including the composition of its assets and liabilities, its expected volume of 
activity, the amount of leverage it employs, and the types of products or services it 
plans to offer.155 In states such as New York, the amount of the non-refundable 
                                                          
 148  Sullivan & Crowmell LLP, Special Purpose National Bank Charters, (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-Special-Purpose-Fintech-National-
Bank-Charters.pdf.  
 149  23 N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 200 (2015).  
 150  See Jen Wieczner, Inside New York’s BitLicense Bottleneck: An ‘Absolute Failure?,’ 
FORTUNE (May 25, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/25/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-new-york-
bitlicense/ (discussing various issues concerning BitLicense applications). 
 151  Id. 
 152  Matthew Leising, Genesis Global Trading Granted BitLicense in New York State, 
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-17/genesis-
global-trading-granted-bitlicense-in-new-york-state (discussing licensing of cryptocurrency 
broker, which had previously operated under BitLicense’s “safe harbor” provision).  
 153  Chrisjan Pauw, BitLicense Approval Shines Fresh Light on New York-Crypto 
Relationship, COIN TELEGRAPH (June 1, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitlicense-
approval-shines-fresh-light-on-new-york-crypto-relationship (mentioning how few BitLicenses 
have been granted and describing an exodus from New York State by several crytpocurrency 
providers despite the state’s sizeable role in financial services).  
 154  23 N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 200.8 (2015). 
 155  Id. 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
2019] CONCEPTUALIZING THE REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND PROVIDERS 63 
 
application fees and minimum capital requirements could well be beyond the reach of 
many potential applicants for full licenses.156  
A final reason supporting enactment of the URCVBA’s “registration” option—
and one in furtherance of Arizona’s sandbox and the “safe harbor” provided to pre-
effective-date applicants for BitLicenses—is that the states have long served as testing 
grounds for new financial products and services.157 As the Treasury’s 2018 Fintech 
Report noted: 
The United States has a long and complex history of state and federal 
regulation in financial services. The U.S. banking system began through 
state charters. In many ways, the state-based system acts as a laboratory of 
innovation for firms, which should be preserved. In fact, the state model 
has allowed for numerous nonbank firms to build a local product in a state, 
and then subsequently expand as the product gained broader market 
appeal.158 
The report continued with a final factor favoring having provider- or product-
incubation capacity at the state level: 
State regulators have greater proximity to their constituents and can be 
more responsive to the needs and preferences of local consumers than 
regulators who do not have a local presence.159 
As this Part suggests, there may be many reasons why creating incubator options—
such as Arizona’s sandbox periods, the BitLicense’s “safe harbor” operations, and the 
“registration” option under Section 207 of the URVCBA—is a good approach to 
regulating a young, and frequently morphing community of providers of financial 
services. Additional reasons stem from high application fees required for more mature 
“money transmitters” or “money services businesses” and from high, ongoing capital 
requirements. The small-scale testing that the URVCBA allows also can help 
regulators learn about the marketplace participants and various products and services 
being offered. Other benefits may attend incubators in the pursuit of information-
based economies, such as collaborations among participants.160  
                                                          
 156  DavisPolk, New York’s Final “BitLicense” Rule: Overview and Changes From July 
2014 Proposal 3 (2015), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/new_yorks_final_bitlicense_rule_overview_changes_july_2
014_proposal.pdf. 
 157  See 2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11, at 13. 
 158  Id. at 66. 
 159  Id.  
 160  For a recent study of incubators and a literature review, see Hanadi Mubarak Al-Mubarak 
& Michael Busler, Challenges and Opportunities of Innovation and Incubators as a Tool for 
Knowledge-Based Economy, 6 J. OF INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://innovation-entrepreneurship.springeropen.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13731-017-0075-y.  
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 There are risks in not providing for sandboxes for fintech innovations. One 
is that market participants will go elsewhere to regulate, taking intellectual property, 
talent, and innovations with them.161 Another is described in the next Part of this essay.  
IV. LIABILITY UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1960 
Beyond the policy reasons to use incubators or regulatory sandboxes to encourage 
innovations in products and services, the most significant reason for greater clarity in 
the regulation of providers of virtual-currency payment and storage products comes 
from federal anti-money laundering regulations and enforcement authority.162 The key 
provision is 18 U.S.C. § 1960, which provides that the knowing conduct, control, 
management, supervision, ownership, or direction of an unlicensed money 
transmitting business shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.163 
To provide more context for why this federal criminal statute is a major reason as to 
why we need regulatory sandboxes or the URVCBA’s “registration” (not licensure) 
option at this point in the development of virtual-currency payments and storage 
products and services, subsection (b)(1) of Section 1960 defines the term “unlicensed 
money transmitting business” as one affecting interstate or foreign commerce “in any 
manner or degree” and: 
(A) is operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a State 
where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under 
State law, whether or not the defendant knew that the operation was 
required to be licensed or that the operation was so punishable;  
(B) fails to comply with the money transmitting business registration 
requirements under section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or 
regulations prescribed under such section; or 
(C) otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are 
known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are 
intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity.164 
The key concern stems from subparagraph (A) above—that if one should have had 
a license to operate a money transmitting business in a State that has prescribed a 
misdemeanor or felony punishment for failure to hold such a license is vulnerable to 
prosecution under section 1960, whether they knew about the requirement to have a 
license.165 This provision makes it imperative to provide opportunities for innovation 
without risk of federal prosecution for innocent providers. The second reason—as 
described in subparagraph (b) above is that failure to register a money transmitting 
business with FinCEN is a separate ground for liability.166  
                                                          
 161  Ernst & Young, As FinTech Evolves, Can Financial Services Innovation Be Compliant? 
3 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-the-emergence-and-impact-of-
regulatory-sandboxes-in-uk-and-across-apac.pdf. 
 162  18 U.S.C. § 1860(a) (2016).  
 163  Id. 
 164  18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2016). 
 165  18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) (2016). 
 166  18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B) (2016).  
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
A recent survey of providers of virtual-currency products and services revealed 
which jurisdictions that they perceived as having the best and worst approaches to 
regulating their businesses.167 The United States topped the list of the “worst 
jurisdictions” and Malta topped the list of the “best jurisdictions.”168 But, what is more 
telling, is that the top answers for both categories was “none.”169  
It appears that virtual-currency businesses do not like regulation. They do not like 
what is happening, or not happening, in the United States. In other times, entities that 
needed physical locations could more easily avoid regulations they did not like by 
either not doing business in the jurisdictions whose requirements they do not wish to 
meet or changing the nature of their products and services to avoid specific 
regulations.  
The regulation of virtual-currency payments- and storage-product providers in the 
United States shows some friction points and is beginning to offer some solutions, as 
this essay has tried to explore. We have not yet reached an inflection point in 
regulating virtual-currency providers.170 Indeed, the Department of the Treasury’s 
report suggests that the inflection point is specifically ahead of us. The report embraces 
a solution to permit “meaningful experimentation in the real world, subject to 
appropriate limitations.”171 It also proposes “a unified solution” that would provide 
equal access to companies in “various stages of the business lifecycle” (e.g., start-ups 
and incumbents).172 The Treasury also suggests that the alternative could be a single 
regulator with power to preempt the other regulators of fintech firms or an additional 
regulator.173 The Treasury’s bottom-line message is clear: if the states do not move to 
more uniformity in regulating providers of virtual-currency products and services in 
the next few years, the Department will ask Congress to adopt a federal regulatory 
scheme.174 Whether or when Congress might do so is anyone’s guess.  
With the Treasury’s recently issued challenge to collaborate or be preempted, the 
states should help create the space for innovation via new approaches to regulating 
new entrants into these emerging payments and asset-storage businesses. States can 
do this whether through more widespread enactment of uniform prudential regulatory 
schemes such as the URVCBA,175 or other devices that States may authorize their non-
                                                          
 167  Nolan Bauerle, State of Blockchain Q2 2018, COINDESK RES., 
https://www.coindesk.com/research/state-of-blockchain-q2-2018/?slide=96 (last visited Sept. 
9, 2018).  
 168  Id.; see Aki, supra note 19. Readers will recall that Malta has not yet fully adopted the 
laws or regulations that apparently contributed to this favorable position among the virtual-
currency marketplace. 
 169  Bauerle, supra note 167. 
 170  2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11, at 168.  
 171  Id. 
 172  Id.  
 173  Id. at 169.  
 174  Id. 
 175  See 2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11, at 67–68 (mentioning specifically the 
URVCBA as a means of harmonizing state regulation of fintech companies). 
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bank regulators to try, perhaps through wider use of the NMLS to streamline license 
applications or other reciprocal license recognition, or sandboxes like that in Arizona.  
The Treasury has offered the states a continuing role in our historical dual-
regulation of providers of financial services—an approach that has served us well 
given differences in size, capital strength, business structure, and other features of 
developing financial services providers and markets.176 Joint regulation has worked 
well through many iterations of products and business models, and through market 
disruptions. The Treasury is signaling that now is the time for the states to step up or 
to risk losing their ability to control which businesses may conduct transactions within 
their states’ boundaries. As traditional hosts of new financial products and services, 
the states should step up because regulating providers of virtual-currency products 
and services is more appropriate now than attempting to regulate virtual currencies 
themselves, and it is more consistent with the States’ traditional roles as regulators of 
non-depository providers of financial products and services.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 176  See generally 2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11. 
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